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Proposals on domestic support were submitted in the WTO agriculture negotiations by 
the USA, the EU, and the G-20 in October 2005, based on the 2004 Framework agreement. This 
paper pays attention to the de minimis rules and the resulting de minimis allowances and projects 
future (2014) distorting support for the USA and the EU-15. It calculates the constraints resulting 
from projected values of production combined with the U.S., EU and G-20 proposals and 
compares their effectiveness in constraining components of distorting support and the projected 
future applied support. The de minimis rules make a difference in estimating how much distorting 
support can be provided in the future. Under the U.S. proposal the Overall commitment does not 
constrain either the USA or the EU. Under the EU and especially the G-20 proposals the Overall 
commitment constrains distorting support to be less than the sum of the cap on blue and the 
maximum usable components. This maximum is smaller than the sum of the commitment on 
Total Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) and the de minimis allowances. The U.S. 
proposal constrains only one component (Current Total AMS) and this only for the EU. The EU 
proposal does not constrain projected future applied support in either the USA or the EU. The 
G-20 proposal constrains the future Current Total AMS for both the USA and the EU. The G-20 
proposal constrains projected future Overall distorting support for the EU but not for the USA. 
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  iiAssessing WTO Constraints on U.S. and EU Domestic Support in Agriculture: 
Assessing the October 2005 Proposals 
 
Introduction 
The 2004 Framework on agriculture in the Doha Round of WTO trade negotiations 
articulated many elements as the basis for the negotiations of full modalities (WTO). Members 
have since submitted proposals referring to the 2004 Framework. In particular, the USA, the EU 
and the G-20 submitted domestic support proposals in October 2005.
1
This paper reviews the major elements of the three domestic support proposals, examines 
some issues that arise in assessing how they would constrain future distorting support, introduces 
projections of future U.S. and EU support, and estimates the severity of any constraints the three 
proposals would impose on projected future U.S. and EU support.
2
 
The October 2005 Domestic Support Proposals 
The major elements of the proposals from the USA, the EU and the G-20 are outlined in 
Table 1. These proposals are to some extent couched in conditional terms relating to progress in 
the negotiations outside of the domestic support pillar. The G-20 proposal refers to earlier 
proposals and elements suggested by the G-20. The proposals address to a varying extent the 
special and differential treatment for developing countries, which is not shown in Table 1. 
                                                      
1 G-20 refers to the following 21 developing country Members of the WTO:  Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, China, Cuba, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. 
 
2 This paper uses the term AMS (Aggregate Measurement of Support) as defined in the Agreement on 
Agriculture, contrary to its use in many popular writings. Since the Agreement on Agriculture does not 
define “amber” support and popular writings ascribe a variety of meanings to the term, it is not used here. 
On the other hand, in spite of the Agreement not defining “blue” or “green” support, popular writings are 
quite uniform in the meanings of these terms: green and blue support is support that is exempt from Current 
Total AMS by conforming to the criteria and conditions of Annex 2 and Art. 6.5, respectively.    
 
  1Total AMS. The USA proposes harmonizing reductions of Members’ Total AMS 
commitments by 83 percent, 60 percent and 37 percent, depending on the size of the base (Final 
Bound Total AMS in Members’ Schedules). This is called an 83/60/37 scenario. The EU 
proposes a 70/60/50 scenario for Total AMS and the G-20 proposes an 80/70/60 scenario. The 
placement in tiers is the same for the three proposals, except that the EU would place Japan either 
in the top tier, where the USA and G-20 proposals place Japan, or in the second tier but with a 
higher percentage cut than for other countries in the second tier (Japan’s Total AMS commitment 
ranks between those of the EU and the USA). 
Overall reduction. The Overall reduction refers to reducing “all trade-distorting domestic 
support”, or Overall support for brevity. Overall support encompasses all non-green support, i.e., 
all blue and AMS support (including de minimis AMSs). For the Overall reduction the three 
proposals also indicate identical placements in tiers, except that the EU proposal is not explicit 
about the placement of Japan. The Overall reduction scenarios proposed by the USA, the EU and 
the G-20 are, respectively, 75/53/31, 70/60/50, and 80/75/70. This leads to several observations.  
The EU proposal would apply the same reduction scenarios for Total AMS and Overall 
support, although the 2004 Framework does not require this. In fact, because of how the base for 
the Overall reduction is calculated, there will be relatively more slack built into the base for 
Overall reduction than in the base for Total AMS reduction. This argues for the percentage 
reduction in Overall support needing to be larger than the reduction in Total AMS.  
The G-20 proposal goes some way towards reducing Overall support by relatively more 
than Total AMS (80/75/70 vs. 80/70/60) but the difference between the scenarios is small.  
  The U.S. proposal makes the Overall reductions (75/53/31) even smaller than the Total 
AMS reductions (83/60/37). This is contrary to the a priori expectation that Overall reductions 
(because of larger built in slack) would need to be relatively larger than Total AMS reductions.     
De minimis. On de minimis the proposals are, like the 2004 Framework, relatively vague 
on what it is that will be reduced (such as “de minimis cut by 50%” [U.S. proposal]) and “de 
  2minimis support should be reduced … by 80%...” [EU proposal]). This is assumed to mean that 
the de minimis percentage of 5 percent, from Art. 6.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture, is to be 
reduced by 50 and 80 percent, respectively. Cutting 5 percent by 50 and by 80 percent leaves 2.5 
and 1 percent, respectively, under the U.S. and EU proposals (these percentages are applied to 
value of production to establish the de minimis allowances). The G-20 proposes that the 
reductions in de minimis “will be such to adjust to the rate of cut for the overall trade-distorting 
support [sic]”. This is interpreted to mean that de minimis AMS support will be allowed only to 
the extent it can be accommodated, along with Current Total AMS and blue box payments, within 
the Overall commitment. The percentage cut can therefore not be determined in advance and will 
only be the result of how much distorting support the country provides and in which form.  
Cap on blue. Both the EU and the G-20 proposals keep the cap on blue payments at 5 
percent of some historical value of production, as per the 2004 Framework. The USA would, 
however, reduce the percentage to 2.5 percent. The USA does not mention how it would pursue 
the additional criteria to be negotiated under the Framework while the EU and the G-20 propose 
limits on the ability of blue payments to offset price drops. G-20 also proposes product-specific 
caps in blue while the EU rejects them. The G-20 proposal rules out the provision of blue 
payments for a product that receives more than de minimis AMS support and also rules out the 
classification of payments as blue if the production volume has increased. 
Caps on product-specific AMSs. The 2004 Framework calls for caps on product-specific 
AMSs according to a methodology to be agreed. The USA proposes to cap product-specific 
AMSs based on 1999-2001, while the EU proposes a 1995-2000 base period and the G-20 a 
1995-2000 averaging period (developing countries would be able to use a different period). The 
G-20 also proposes disciplines “to prevent circumvention of product specific caps”. This may 
include stricter rules for what kind of AMS support can be classified as non-product-specific. 
Green box. The U.S. and EU proposals say little about the green box. USA suggests “no 
material changes” while also explicitly ruling out caps on green box expenditures. The EU 
  3repeats the Framework idea of reviewing and clarifying the green box criteria. The G-20 has 
submitted a list of issues to be reviewed and clarified, including specific language for some. 
Other. Additionally the USA lays out a time schedule for the possible and eventual 
elimination of trade-distorting domestic support measures and also proposes the re-introduction 
of a peace clause. The G-20 suggests how to improve monitoring and surveillance (not only in 
domestic support) and stresses the urgency of addressing the cotton issue. 
The following section discusses some issues arising in the assessment of the constraints 
that would apply to distorting domestic support under the 2004 Framework and further elaborated 
on in the proposals by the USA, the EU and the G-20. 
 
Consideration of the de minimis Rules 
De minimis Rules   
The effect of new domestic support constraints on countries’ ability to provide AMS 
support in the future is often discussed without considering how the de minimis rules work. The 
de minimis provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture are laid out in Art. 6.4.
3 It uses terms such 
as AMS and Current Total AMS, which are defined in Art.1 of the Agreement. There have been 
no suggestions that these articles would be changed, other than the percentage “5”. Observing the 
practices countries have adopted in notifying domestic support to the WTO Committee on 
Agriculture also informs the understanding of the de minimis rules. Enhanced monitoring and 
surveillance is foreseen in the 2004 Framework (para. 48), but there have been no suggestions 
that this should weaken the present practices of claiming de minimis exemptions in notifications.   
                                                      
3 Art 6.4 reads:  
(a) A Member shall not be required to include in the calculation of its Current Total AMS and shall not be 
required to reduce: 
(i) product-specific domestic support which would otherwise be required to be included in a Member’s 
calculation of its Current Total AMS where such support does not exceed 5 per cent of that Member’s 
total value of production of a basic agricultural product during the relevant year, and 
(ii) non-product-specific domestic support which would otherwise be required to be included in a 
Member’s calculation of its Current AMS where such support does not exceed 5 per cent of the value 
of that Member’s total agricultural production. 
 
  4Assessing how the proposals would constrain future AMS support without considering 
the de minimis rules gives estimates that deviate from the AMS support that will in fact be 
allowed. The present examination of two such deviations looks at the three AMS components of 
distorting domestic support: Current Total AMS, de minimis non-product-specific AMS, and the 
sum of de minimis product-specific AMSs. It distinguishes between allowed support within the 
constraints (commitments or allowances) and current support that counts towards the constraints.  
 
Values of Production: Historical or Current 
The amount of AMS support that can be exempted from future Current Total AMS on de 
minimis grounds (de minimis allowance) is often estimated by applying a de minimis percentage 
to historical values of production, such as 2001 or 2004. This deviates, however, from the de 
minimis provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture (Art. 6.4). Art. 6.4 refers, at least in the case 
of product-specific de minimis AMSs, to the value of production “during the relevant year”. 
Moreover, usual practice in notifying domestic support is to base de minimis claims on the value 
of production of the notified year, not a historical year. Estimating future de minimis allowances 
thus requires first estimating the value of production for a future year, such as 2014.
4   
If value of production is stable, the estimated de minimis allowances based on the 2001 
value of production will be close to those based on the 2014 value. However, for countries with a 
rapidly growing value of production in agriculture, such as Brazil, the amounts that may in the 
future be exempted as de minimis AMS will be significantly different from the corresponding 
amounts in 2001 or 2004. The value of production in U.S. agriculture may also grow considerably 
by 2014. The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s baseline projections for 2014 indicate a value of 
production for the sector of around $260 billion, which is 30% larger than the $200 billion or so 
that is usually assumed for recent years. The 2014 de minimis exemptions for the USA would 
                                                      
4 The implementation of reduction commitments from the Doha Round is assumed to be complete in 2014. 
  
  5thus be 30 percent larger if the 2014 values of production were used in the analysis, regardless of 
the  de minimis percentage applied. If value of production declines, using a historical value 
overestimates what can in the future be exempted as de minimis. For example, Japan’s agriculture 
value of production is shrinking by an average of one or two percent per year. 
 
Maximum Usable Components 
The allowed future amount of AMS support (support that is neither green nor blue) is 
sometimes estimated as the sum of the Total AMS commitment, the de minimis allowances for 
product-specific AMSs for all products, and the de minimis allowance for non-product-specific 
AMS. For example, if the future Total AMS commitment is $7.6 billion, and 2.5 percent of future 
value of production in the agriculture sector as a whole is $6.5 billion, the future sum of allowed 
AMS components would be $7.6 + $6.5 + $6.5 = $20.6 billion. The $6.5 billion is counted once 
for the sum of product-specific de minimis allowances and once for the non-product-specific de 
minimis allowance. However, because of how the de minimis rules work, this is an overestimate 
of what can actually be provided in the form of AMS support, whether de minimis or not. 
 
De minimis Allowances: Theoretical Cases 
Assume that a country seeks to provide as much AMS support as is theoretically possible, 
given its Total AMS commitment and the applicable de minimis percentage, such as 1, 2.5, or 5 
percent of value of production (assume the amounts of $7.6 and $6.5 billion, respectively, in this 
illustration). There are three extreme cases to consider, summing different combinations of the 
Total AMS commitment, de minimis allowances for product-specific AMSs and the de minimis 
allowance for non-product-specific AMS. (See Table 2 and Figure 1). 
1.  Provide a non-product-specific AMS just up to the de minimis threshold ($6.5 billion), 
and provide a product-specific AMS for each and every product in the agriculture sector just up to 
the product’s de minimis threshold (these AMSs thus sum to $6.5 billion). A total of $13 billion 
  6of AMS support is provided. The Current Total AMS has to be zero, since all AMSs are 
exempted as de minimis. The Total AMS commitment is unused ($7.6 billion). 
2.  Provide a non-product-specific AMS just up to the de minimis threshold ($6.5 billion), 
provide product-specific AMSs for each and every product in the agriculture sector in amounts 
that are larger than each product’s de minimis allowance and which sum to the Total AMS 
commitment. The Current Total AMS is equal to the Total AMS commitment or, in other words, 
both the Total AMS commitment and the non-product-specific de minimis allowance are used to 
the hilt. A total of $6.5 + $7.6 = $14.1 billion is provided. The sum of the product-specific de 
minimis allowances is unused ($6.5 billion). 
3.  Provide a non-product-specific AMS just up to the de minimis threshold ($6.5 billion), 
and provide product-specific AMSs for some of the individual products in amounts that are larger 
than their de minimis allowances and which add up to the Total AMS commitment. At the limit, 
one product-specific AMS would be concentrated on only one product with an infinitesimally 
small value of production. That product-specific AMS would be as large as the Total AMS 
commitment. This would allow product-specific AMSs to be provided for all the other products 
in the sector in amounts just up to their respective de minimis allowances. In the limit case, the 
country would fully use its Total AMS commitment, its non-product-specific de minimis 
allowance, and almost all of its product-specific de minimis allowances. In practice, of course, 
product-specific AMSs larger than the de minimis allowances will be provided to real products 
with each product accounting for a significant share of the sector’s value of production. The only 
question for the analysis of this case is what to assume about the share of the sector on which the 
larger-than-de-minimis product-specific AMSs are concentrated. 
 
Maximum Usable Components 
In its notifications for 1995 to 2001 the USA reports larger-than-de-minimis product-
specific AMSs on products accounting for between 12 percent (in 1995) and 40 percent (in 1999) 
  7of the agriculture sector’s value of production. The EU reports corresponding percentages of 61 
percent in 2000 and 60 percent in 2001.
5 However, the distribution of product-specific AMSs in 
the past is not necessarily a guide for the future. For example, the 2004 Framework requires caps 
on product-specific AMSs. If the caps are low enough, it will not be possible to distribute the 
whole Total AMS commitment as larger-than-de-minimis product-specific AMSs for only a few 
products. Political considerations may also make it difficult to do so.  
On the other hand, policy changes may reduce or eliminate the amounts reported as 
product-specific AMSs for some products. The EU 2003 CAP decision, for example, reduced the 
“applied administered price” such that only de minimis AMSs or zero are reported for some 
products.
6 Japan’s price policy changes reduce the reported product-specific AMSs for rice and 
milk. Similar changes are possible for some products for which the USA reports significant 
product-specific AMSs, e.g., dairy and sugar. Such decisions would make the past distribution of 
product-specific AMSs largely irrelevant as a guide in estimating the future distribution.  
Assume therefore that the USA and the EU will seek to make Current Total AMS equal 
the Total AMS commitment by providing larger-than-de-minimis AMSs to products that account 
for half of the sector’s value of production. This would allow the product-specific de minimis 
allowances for the products accounting for the other half of the sector’s value of production to be 
fully “used”. If an equally arbitrary 1/3 and 2/3 split was assumed instead of the half and half, 
Current Total AMS would consist of product-specific AMSs for products that account for 1/3 of 
the sector’s value of production, and the product-specific de minimis allowances for products 
accounting for the other 2/3 of the sector’s value of production would be fully “used”.          
The individual components of the illustrative example are shown in Table 2 and Figure 1. 
They sum to $20.6 billion. In Case 1 the Total AMS commitment is not used at all, but all de 
                                                      
5 These percentages are calculated from data in U.S. and EU notifications. EU notifications give value of 
production by product only from 2000 onwards. 
 
6 The applied administered price is the term used in the Agreement on Agriculture (Annex 3). The EU uses 
intervention prices as the applied administered price. 
  8minimis allowances, whether product-specific or non-product-specific, are fully used. The 
maximum amount of AMS support that can be provided is $13 billion. In Case 2 the sum is a 
somewhat larger amount of AMS support ($14.1 billion), since the fully used Total AMS 
commitment is larger than the (unused) sum of product-specific de minimis allowances. Finally in 
Case 3 the usable components sum to $17.4 billion.
7
At least one of the three AMS components is, either in full or in part, never usable. The 
usable sum of the AMS components is always less than the full sum of the three AMS 
components.
8 Call this usable sum “Maximum Usable Components” (MUC).
9  
 
Constraints Resulting from the October 2005 Proposals 
This section estimates the constraints that would apply to AMS support and Overall 
support if the provisions of the U.S., EU and G-20 proposals were implemented. The estimation 
is done for the USA and the EU, using projections of these Members’ support for 2014. 
 
Estimating 2014 Distorting Support 
The projections of distorting support in 2014 for the USA are based on projected prices 
and payments in the USDA Baseline projections from February 2005. The de minimis allowances 
                                                      
7 A 1/3 and 2/3 split would generate about $18.4 billion as the sum of usable components. Concentrating 
the whole Total AMS commitment on a smaller and smaller share of the sector eventually leads to using 
the whole Total AMS commitment on a product that accounts for almost none of the sector’s value of 
production. Examples can be conceived in which a country’s Total AMS commitment is much smaller than 
the sum of the product-specific de minimis allowances (Argentina would be an example). The role of the 
arbitrary half and half assumption in calculating the sum of the usable components would accordingly be 
larger since the product-specific de minimis allowances would  make up a larger part of the sum of the 
usable components. Similarly, in the analysis of a country with a large Total AMS commitment relative to 
the sum of the product-specific de minimis allowances, the role of the half and half assumption is smaller.        
 
8 Intuitively this is also explained as “an AMS can not at the same time be de minimis and part of Current 
Total AMS”. This application in an actual future notification has its converse in what is referred to as 
“double-counting” in establishing the base for the Overall reduction (Roberts). This seems to require 
interpreting the “permitted de minimis level” of the 2004 Framework (para. 7) as meaning “de minimis 
allowances for products whose AMSs are not included in Current Total AMS”. 
 
9 The MUC, consisting only of AMS components, is one component of the variable introduced in earlier 
analysis as “Maximum Distorting Support” or MDS (Brink). MDS is the sum of MUC and the blue cap. 
  9are calculated from the corresponding 2014 values of production. The Baseline assumes that the 
policy parameters of the 2002 Farm Bill will continue to apply. Because market prices of major 
crops are projected to be significantly higher in 2014 than in recent years, the amounts of AMS 
payments are projected to be nil or very low. The 2014 Current Total AMS is therefore as low as 
$6.5 billion, most of which consists of market price support for dairy ($5.2 billion) and sugar 
($1.2 billion). Because the AMSs for other products than dairy and sugar are so small and are 
made for products which account for so little of the agriculture sector’s value of production, it 
makes very little difference in the results whether they are above or below future de minimis 
thresholds of 1 or 2.5 or 5 percent of future value of production. The Baseline projects Counter-
Cyclical Payments (CCP) of between 0.5 and $1 billion in 2014. For this analysis it is assumed 
that a combination of negotiated criteria for blue payments and corresponding changes to the 
present CCP will allow the 2014 payments to be classified as blue. 
While the Baseline projection gives a point estimate of future payments it does not 
account for the possibility of market prices falling below that estimate. The continued 2002 Farm 
Bill provisions would then trigger payments that in some cases would be significant. Values of 
production would also be different, resulting in different de minimis allowances. This analysis 
does not evaluate these situations (see, e.g., Babcock and Hart, and Westhoff, Brown and Hart for 
such analysis). Under the three proposals examined, the USA would in any case have future 
ceilings on AMS support at least of the order of $11 billion (smaller if de minimis allowances are 
not used, larger if used). In the case of lower prices in 2014, this would still leave some room for 
larger payments in 2014 than the very small payments projected in the Baseline. The USA may 
also create more room for AMS payments in 2014 by removing measured market price support 
for dairy by eliminating the support price milk (as legislated in the 1996 Farm Bill but later 
rescinded). This would leave room for more than $5 billion of AMS payments within the Total 
AMS commitment. Reform of the sugar policy has also been mentioned, which could shift at 
least some support from market price support in AMS to various exempt categories. 
  10The projections of distorting support in 2014 for the EU are based on estimates of how 
the 2001/02 notification will change under full implementation of the reforms decided in 1999 
(Agenda 2000), 2003 and 2004. EU sugar policy is assumed to change as per the European 
Commission’s proposal of June 2005. Many of the changes consist of reducing or eliminating 
intervention prices, which reduces the price gaps that the EU would report for 2014. The eligible 
production quantities that the EU might use to calculate market price support for 2014 are 
assumed to be the same as the quantities projected in 2012 (EC 2005b).
10         
The projected 2014 AMS components for the USA and the EU are shown in Tables 4 and 
5 (along with rough estimates of the AMS components that might eventually underlie the U.S. 
and EU notifications for 2004). The EU estimates are for the EU-15. The EU’s 2004 notification 
will be for the EU-25, and the 2014 notification is expected to be for a still larger EU. However, a 
significant result of the 2003 and later reforms, along with the rules governing support in the new 
member states, is that relatively little of the support in these states will be of the AMS type. Based 
on the projections of support components and values of production for 2014 in the USA and the 
EU, it is possible to derive the constraints that would result from the three October 2005 
proposals and see to what extent they would actually constrain the projected 2014 support. The 
results are shown for the USA in Table 6 and Figure 2 and for the EU in Table 7 and Figure 3.
11  
 
Current Support in 2004 and 2014 
For both the USA and the EU the projected Current Overall support in 2014 is less than 
half of the estimated Current Overall support in 2004 (from $20.8 billion to $10.0 billion in the 
                                                      
10 This refers to common wheat, durum wheat (total wheat less soft wheat), barley, maize, skimmed milk 
powder and butter. Quantities of sorghum, triticale and rice are assumed be the same as in 2001/02, while 
the elimination of the intervention price for rye obviates the need for a quantity projection for rye. While 
caps on intervention purchases are in place for rice, butter, and skimmed milk powder, it is assumed that 
total production will remain the eligible production for market price support in AMS. 
 
11 The de minimis allowances under the G-20 proposal cannot be determined independently of the Overall 
commitments. The analysis initially assumes that the de minimis allowances under the G-20 proposal can 
be no larger than the present 5 percent applied to value of production in 2000-02. 
 
  11USA and from €52.5 billion to €23.9 billion in the EU; Tables 6 and 7).
12 While reduction 
commitments are not taken from current (“applied”) support in 2004 but from base amounts, the 
effects of negotiating proposals are often expressed in terms of reductions from 2004 support. It is 
thus instructive to see that U.S. and EU “applied” distorting support can be projected to decline 
by more than 50 percent between 2004 and 2014 just as a result of the high projected market 
prices in the USA and the implementation of CAP reforms in the EU.       
 
MUC vs. sum of allowed AMS components 
For the USA the Maximum Usable Components (MUC) under the U.S., EU and G-20 
proposals would be lower than the sum of allowed AMS components by amounts ranging from 
$1.3 billion to $4.8 billion (for example, under the EU proposal, the MUC of $11.5 billion is $1.3 
billion less than the $12.8 billion sum of allowed components; Table 6 and Figure 2). These 
differences are not huge but may nevertheless be significant. If maximizing the amount of AMS 
support was a future policy objective, the MUC would be the relevant constraint, not the sum of 
allowed AMS components.
13 The fact that the MUC is of the order of 10-15% smaller than the 
sum of allowed components would need to be built into future expectations of policy outcomes. 
For the EU the MUC is lower than the sum of allowed AMS components by 14 percent 
(U.S. proposal), 5 percent (EU proposal), and 20 percent (G-20 proposal) (Table 7 and Figure 3). 
Again, and for the same reasons as for the USA, the differences may be significant in the context 
of an assumed objective of providing as much support as possible within applicable constraints. 
Recall, however, that the underlying MUC amounts for the USA and the EU result from 
                                                      
12 The 2004 Framework uses several different labels for “Overall support”: overall reduction(s), all trade-
distorting domestic support, sum of all trade-distorting domestic support, and overall trade-distorting 
domestic support. Since these labels encompass all distorting support and not the presumed non-distorting 
green support, a suitable label could be Overall Distorting Support or perhaps Overall support for short. In 
any case, a variable called something like Current Overall support will be needed to parallel the Current 
Total AMS in the present Agreement on Agriculture, i.e., measure current support against the commitment. 
 
13 Maximizing the amount of AMS support that can be provided within the applicable constraints is not 
necessarily a farfetched assumption. Examples of how the USA might manage support to stay within limits 
instead of simply reducing support are discussed by, e.g., Babcock and Hart, and Sumner. 
  12assuming that Current Total AMS (up to the Total AMS commitment) is concentrated on 
products accounting for half of the sector’s value of production. A different share would generate 
smaller or larger differences between MUC and the sum of allowed AMS components. 
 
Overall support 
Adding the cap on blue to either the sum of allowed AMS components or the MUC yields 
one of the constraints that will apply to the sum of blue and AMS support in 2014. The cap on 
blue is fixed regardless of which constraint on AMS support it is added to. The difference 
between, on the one hand, the sum of the blue cap and the sum of allowed AMS components 
($25.5 billion under the U.S. proposal) and, on the other hand, the sum of the blue cap and the 
MUC (blue cap + MUC; $22.2 billion) is therefore the same as the difference between the sum of 
allowed AMS components and the MUC. More interesting is the comparison between (1) blue 
cap + MUC, and (2) the Overall commitment. The Overall commitment constrains the Current 
Overall support. This sum of all current non-green support components (sum of 2014 current blue 
and all 2014 current AMS components) is not allowed to exceed the 2014 Overall commitment. 
The USA. The U.S. proposal results in an Overall commitment of $22.5 billion for the 
USA. Assume that the USA actually does provide AMS support equal to $20.7 billion, i.e., the 
sum of allowed AMS components (in fact, this is not allowed under the de minimis rules, as 
explained above in defining MUC). Add to this the blue cap of $4.8 billion, which is assumed to 
be fully used. Adding the blue cap to the sum of allowed AMS components gives $25.5 billion 
(Table 6 and Figure 2). This sum is larger than the $22.5 billion Overall commitment and would 
not, even if allowed, be a binding constraint on Overall support.  
However, the blue cap + MUC is only $22.2 billion, which is less than the $22.5 billion 
Overall commitment. The blue cap + MUC is therefore the binding constraint and the Overall 
commitment is non-binding. Turning to the EU and G-20 proposals as applied to the USA, the 
respective Overall commitments for the USA ($19.2 and $12.0 billion) are smaller than the blue 
  13cap + MUC (Table 6 and Figure 2). The Overall commitment is therefore, under both the EU and 
the G-20 proposals, the binding constraint on U.S. non-green support. Interestingly, for the USA 
the Overall commitment under all three proposals is larger than the $10.0 billion projected as 
2014 Current Overall support. Thus the Overall commitment would constrain not what the USA 
is projected to provide in distorting support but only the extent to which the USA could increase 
support if market prices are significantly lower in 2014 than in the Baseline projection. 
The EU. For the EU the Overall commitment (€28.7 billion) is also under the U.S. 
proposal larger than the blue cap + MUC (€27.6 billion; Table 7 and Figure 3). The Overall 
commitment is thus a non-binding constraint for the EU, as for the USA. The blue cap + MUC is 
the binding constraint. For the EU the difference between the two constraints (€1.1 billion) is 
larger than for the USA. Both the EU proposal and the G-20 proposal impose an Overall 
commitment low enough to effectively constrain the EU sum of blue and AMS support to less 
than the blue cap + MUC. The Overall commitment for the EU under all three proposals is larger 
than or close to the €23.9 billion projected as 2014 Current Overall support (Table 7 and Figure 
3). Thus for the EU the Overall commitment constrains not what the EU is projected to provide in 
distorting support but its ability to reverse the policy reforms currently being implemented. 
 
De minimis reductions under the G-20 proposal  
The de minimis components under the G-20 proposal require a separate discussion. The 
G-20 proposal is interpreted here to mean that de minimis AMSs can be exempted from Current 
Total AMS only to the extent that they can be accommodated within the Overall commitment. 
The de minimis AMS allowances entered under the G-20 proposal in Tables 6 and 7 are the initial 
ones resulting from applying 5 percent to the 2000-02 values of production (this assumes that the 
2014 de minimis allowances can be no larger than in 2000-02; assuming that they can be even 
larger would be contrary to G-20 objectives). However, the Overall commitments of $12.0 billion 
(USA) and €23.0 billion (EU) are much smaller than the sums of blue caps and MUC, which are 
  14$29.7 billion (USA) and €44.0 billion (EU). This shows that the de minimis allowances initially 
included in MUC are much too large. In fact, the Overall commitment for both the USA and the 
EU is so much smaller than the sum of the blue cap and MUC that the G-20 proposal implies a de 
minimis percentage of zero (i.e., no de minimis allowances).  
Eliminating the de minimis allowances from MUC under the G-20 proposal leaves only 
the Total AMS commitment, which reduces the sum of the blue cap and the MUC significantly. 
For the USA the sum of the blue cap and the Total AMS commitment is $15.3 billion. The G-20 
Overall commitment of $12.0 billion is lower than even this amount, so the G-20 proposal means 
that the USA will not be able to fully use the sum of its cap on blue and its Total AMS 
commitment. The amount of “unusable room” ($3.3 billion) can be taken from the cap on blue, 
from the Total AMS commitment, or from a combination of the two. For the EU the “unusable 
room” between the Overall commitment (€23.0 billion) and the sum of the cap on blue and the 
Total AMS commitment (€25.6 billion) is €2.6 billion Again, this amount of “unusable room” 
can be taken from the cap on blue, from the Total AMS commitment, or from a combination. 
 
Limitations 
  Not knowing the values of production in the year when implementation of the reduction 
commitments are assumed to be complete (such as 2014) introduces considerable uncertainty. 
Since the future de minimis allowances are determined by values of production, the amounts of 
the MUC can differ from those used in the analysis. This applies particularly to the U.S. example, 
where the projected amount of AMS support is so closely related to the prices that also help to 
determine values of production. The limitation is reinforced by looking at only one projection of 
2014 payments rather than a set of projections based on probability distributions of yields (such 
as Hart and Babcock, and Westhoff, Brown and Hart). Uncertainty also attaches to future policy 
decisions, such as an elimination of measured market price support for sugar and dairy, which 
would generate “room” for support to other products. Likewise, the EU may replace market price 
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Current Total AMS much less than the €20 billion used here, with only a part of the difference 
being counted as blue, and would change the conclusions about the new constraints being binding 
or not. The caps on product-specific AMSs might also moderate the ability to use any additional 
“room” within the constraints on Total AMS and MUC, which might change the conclusions.          
 
Conclusions  
  The proposals submitted in October 2005 by the USA, the EU and the G-20 differ 
significantly in key features that would determine future constraints on distorting domestic 
support. This includes not only the reduction percentages for Total AMS and Overall support but 
also the reductions of de minimis percentages, the size of the cap on blue, the base period for caps 
on product-specific AMSs, and the rules and criteria for classifying support as green or blue. 
Estimating the effectiveness of the future constraints on distorting support to constrain 
future support, while taking account of the de minimis rules of the Agreement on Agriculture, 
requires analysis based on estimated future values of production rather than historical values. This 
can be important if the value of production in the future is expected to differ significantly from 
historical values of production, which may be the case for the USA and the EU. 
The de minimis rules also require that the analysis go beyond calculating simply the full 
sum of the allowed components of AMS support (Total AMS commitment, non-product-specific 
de minimis AMS allowance, and the sum of product-specific de minimis AMS allowances). It is 
important to consider the smaller sum of allowed AMS components that accounts for the fact that 
an AMS cannot at the same be exempt as de minimis and be part of Current Total AMS. This sum 
is called Maximum Usable Components (MUC). In practice the future difference between the full 
sum of components of AMS support and the MUC may amount to one or a few billion dollars or 
euros for the USA and the EU. While not large in comparison to the amounts of support provided 
  16in recent years, this difference can nevertheless be significant in evaluating the future constraints 
arising from commitments taken in the Doha negotiations. 
For the USA, the reduced Total AMS commitment by itself under either the U.S. or the 
EU proposal will not be low enough to constrain projected 2014 Current Total AMS, whereas the 
Total AMS commitment under the G-20 proposal is low enough to be a constraint. For the EU, 
the reduced Total AMS commitment under both the U.S. proposal and the G-20 proposal will be 
low enough to constrain projected 2014 Current Total AMS. The EU proposal would not reduce 
the EU 2014 Total AMS commitment enough to constrain Current Total AMS. 
The Overall commitment of the U.S. proposal will not be a binding constraint on the sum 
of blue and AMS support for either the USA or the EU (under the Baseline projections for prices 
and quantities that underlie this analysis). Instead the (smaller) sum of the blue cap and MUC will 
be binding. If future values of production were lower than projected, the future de minimis 
allowances would also be smaller, making the sum of the blue cap and MUC even smaller and 
reinforcing the role of this constraint. Under the EU and the G-20 proposals the Overall 
commitment would be the binding constraint on the sum of blue and AMS support for both the 
USA and the EU. If the future value of production is significantly smaller than projected, the sum 
of the blue cap and MUC would be the binding constraint on the sum of blue and AMS support. 
While the G-20 proposal does not specify a particular reduction of the de minimis 
percentage, the depth of cut in the Overall commitment is large enough to imply the elimination 
of de minimis allowances for both the USA and the EU. This is the same as reducing the de 
minimis percentage from 5 percent to zero. Even with the elimination of the de minimis 
allowances under the G-20 proposal, the sum of the blue cap and the Total AMS commitment is 
larger than the Overall commitment for the USA and the EU. This means that the G-20 proposal 
will prevent the USA and the EU from fully using either blue payments up to the blue cap or 
AMS support up to the Total AMS commitment, or both. 
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Annex: Data and Methods for Estimating 2014 Support 
The estimates in Tables 3, 4 and 5 update the estimates used by Brink, which relied on 
projections from 2004 by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the European Commission. The 
present data for U.S. 2014 support comes mainly from projections made in 2005 (USDA 2005a) 
and EU data draw on EC (2005b).  
USA: Value of production (VOP) for 2000 and 2001: notification G/AG/N/USA/51; 
USA 2002: sum of “value of crop production” and “value of livestock production” (USDA 2004), 
reduced by the difference ($3.5 billion) between this sum and earlier years’ notified VOP. USA 
2014: based on $264.3 billion projected by USDA (2005b, Table 29). From this, $4 billion is 
subtracted to account for the future difference (about $3.5 billion) between that series and U.S. 
notified VOP. Support estimates for the USA: USA has notified Current Total AMS for 2001. 
Table 4 uses this data along with 2014 projections associated mainly with the USDA Baseline 
(USDA 2005a, Output 95). Price gaps for market price support assume unchanging administered 
prices from 2004 and are multiplied by projected 2014 production. AMS payments in 2014 are 
assumed to comprise mainly loan deficiency payments and marketing loan gains. Counter-
cyclical payments (assumed blue) in 2014 from the Baseline are as low as $526 million (USDA 
2005a, Output 50). Other projections can be higher (e.g., FAPRI shows $2,822 million in 
2014/15). Crop Insurance in non-product-specific AMS is total indemnities less producer-paid 
  19premiums (crop year data from FAPRI). It is assumed that Direct Payments in 2014 will not be 
part of Current Total AMS (claimed as green, blue or de minimis AMS). 
EU-15: VOP for 2000 and 2001: notifications G/AG/N/EEC/49 and G/AG/N/EEC/51; 
EU-15 2002: the 2002 observation of €252.2 billion (EC 2005a, Table 3.1.5) multiplied by 97% 
to account for observed differences between that series and notified data for earlier years. The 
2000-02 average is increased by 10% to account for assumed nominal growth between 2000-02 
and 2014. Support estimates for the EU-15: The 2014 projection assumes that EU policy as 
changed by the 2003 and 2004 CAP reforms will remain in 2014. Sugar policy is assumed to 
change as in CEC (2005a). All these changes may enable the EU-15 to calculate a much smaller 
Current Total AMS in 2014 than in recent years. No market oriented reform of the fruit, vegetable 
and wine sectors is assumed. Production quantities for the market price support component of 
AMS in 2014 for common wheat, durum wheat (total wheat less soft wheat), barley, maize, SMP 
and butter are assumed equal to the 2012 projections in EC (2005b). Quantities of sorghum, 
triticale and rice are assumed equal to 2001/02 (eliminating the intervention price for rye is 
assumed to bring market price support to nil). The quantity of sugar is calculated by multiplying 
EU-25 production in 2012/13 (12.2 million tonnes) by the EU-15 share of EU-25 production in 
2003/04 (82%) (CEC 2005b). Eliminating the sugar intervention price may result in the EU 
notifying no market price support for sugar, which would affect Current Total AMS by much 
more than the deviations from projected quantities. The estimate of 2014 blue payments for the 
EU-15 is based on the following assumptions: 90% of all EU-15 direct payments in 2014 are part 
of the Single Farm Payment (in line with EC 2005b, section 1.1(1)); all other significant direct 
payments are claimed as blue; the same national ceilings on Single Farm Payments as in 2013 
apply in 2014. For the EU-15 those ceilings sum to €33.2 billion (CAP Monitor, Section 4, 
Appendix 2). Blue payments in 2014 are thus estimated as €33.2/0.9 - €33.2 = €3.7 billion. 
  20Table 1. Comparing the U.S., EU and G-20 October 2005 Proposals 
   Proposal by USA 
10 October 
  Proposal by EU 
28 October 
  Proposal by G-20 
12 October and earlier elements 
          






























          






























          
Cut de minimis % by    50%    80%    adjust to Overall reduction 
          
Cap on blue at    2.5%    5%    5% 
          
Rules for blue    ?    limit ability to offset 
price drops; no PS caps  
  limit ability to offset price drops; PS 
caps; non-accumulation; no 
production increase 
          
Caps on PS AMSs 
based on 
  1999-2001    1995-2000    1995-2000 (not for Brazil); discipline 
on disguising PS support as NPS 
          
Green box    ”no material changes”; 
no caps 
  ”review and clarify”    identifies specific issues for “review 
and clarification” 
          
Other    peace clause; interlude 
and elimination 
      monitoring and surveillance; cotton 
 
Note:  
Captures only major deviations from or further specification of provisions of the July 2004 Framework. The placement 
in tiers underlying the harmonizing reductions of Total AMS and Overall is based on data in World Trade 
Organization, Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, “Total Aggregate Measurement of Support” 
(TN/AG/S/13/Add.1; 28 February 2005), and “Total Value of Agricultural Production” (TN/AG/S/21, 4 July 2005).   
 
Sources: 
“U.S. Proposal for WTO Agriculture Negotiations”, Office of the United States Trade Representative, 10/10/2005. 
www.ustr.gov/Trade_Sectors/Agriculture/US_Proposal_for_WTO_Agriculture_Negotiations.html 
 
“Statement of EU conditional negotiating proposals - with explanatory annotations”, European Commission, 




“G-20 Proposal on Domestic Support”, 12 October 2005. www.ictsd.org/ministerial/hongkong/docs/G20proposal.pdf 
 
“G-20 Draft Elements for Discussion - Blue Box”, FINAL 04/07/07. www.sagpya.mecon.gov.ar/new/0-
0/programas/negociaciones/Omc/g20_06.pdf 
 
“G-20 Proposal for the Establishment of Prodtict[sic]-Specific caps in AMS”, Product-Specific Caps in AMS, FINAL 
07/10/2005. www.tradeobservatory.org/library.cfm?RefID=77205 
 
“Review and Clarification of Green Box Criteria”, G20/DS/Greenbox, FINAL 02/06/05. 
www.tradeobservatory.org/library.cfm?RefID=73230 
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Table 2. Illustrating the Calculation of Maximum Usable Components (MUC) 
Case 3 (MUC) 
Total AMS commitment 
+ NPS dm allowance 
+ sum of PS AMS dm 
allowances on products 
accounting for  










+ sum of PS AMS 
dm allowances on 
products 
accounting for  the 




+ NPS dm 
allowance 









            
Total AMS 
commitment  7.6  0 7.6 7.6  7.6  Current Total 
AMS  6.5 
NPS AMS dm 
allowance  6.5  6.5 6.5 6.5  6.5  Used NPS dm 
AMS  3.0 
Sum of PS AMS 
dm allowances  6.5 6.5  0  3.3  4.3  Used PS dm 
AMSs  0 
            
Sum of above 
components of 
AMS support 
20.6  13.0 14.1 17.4  18.4 





Note: The righthand column of 2014 projected AMS support (U.S. example) is shown only for the purpose of 
comparison. 
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Table 3. Basic data for estimating components and commitments  
   USA (US$ billion)  EU-15 (€ billion) 
Value of production (VOP)    
2000  189.5 USA/51  notification  243.4 EEC/49  notification 
2001  198.5 USA/51  notification  246.4 EEC/51  notification 
2002  188.5  USDA farm income (Note 1)  244.6  97% of €252.2 (Note 2) 
average  2000-02  192.2   244.8  
2014 starting assumptions  264.3  = USDA Baseline  244.8  = average 2000-02 
projection 2014  260.3    less $4 billion (Note 1)  269.3     plus 10% (Note 2) 
De minimis allowances based on estimated 2000-02 VOP (“permitted de minimis”) 
5% of 2000-02 VOP  9.6    12.2   
De minimis allowances based on projected 2014 VOP   
5% of 2014 VOP  13.0    13.5   
2.5% of 2014 VOP  6.5    6.7   
1.0% of 2014 VOP  2.6    2.7   
Blue box entitlement fixed 2007-14 (based on value of production in assumed base period 2000-02) 
5% of 2000-02 VOP  9.6    12.2   
Estimated "existing blue box payments"    
2001  0 USA/51  notification  23.7 EEC/51  notification 
2002  0  assume no blue payments  21.5  OECD PSE data base 
2003  0  assume no blue payments  24.3  OECD PSE data base 
2001-03 0    23.2   
Total AMS: Base, End Commitments, 2014 Current 
2000 onwards  19.1  Base = Final Bound Total AMS  67.2  Base = Final Bound Total AMS 
U.S. proposal  7.6  cut by 60%  11.4  cut by 83% 
EU proposal  7.6  cut by 60%  20.1  cut by 70% 
G-20 proposal  5.7  cut by 70%  13.4  cut by 80% 
2014 Current Total AMS  6.5  from Table 4  19.4  from Table 5 
Overall Support: Calculate Base 
Final Bound Total AMS  19.1    67.2   
Blue box component  9.6  5% VOP 2000-02  23.2  payments 2001-03 (Note 3) 
PS de minimis allowance  9.6  5% VOP 2000-02  12.2  5% VOP 2000-02 
NPS de minimis allowance  9.6  5% VOP 2000-02  12.2  5% VOP 2000-02 
   Base Overall  47.9  sum of above four components  114.8  sum of above four components 
Overall Support: End Commitments 
U.S. proposal  22.5  cut by 53%  28.7  cut by 75% 
EU proposal  19.2  cut by 60%  34.4  cut by 70% 
G-20 proposal  12.0  cut by 75%  23.0  cut by 80% 
Overall Support: Calculate 2014 Current 
2014 Current Total AMS  6.5  from Table 4  19.4  from Table 5 
2014 Blue payments  0.5  from Annex  3.7  from Annex 
2014 PS de minimis AMS  0  from Table 4  0.2  from Table 5 
2014 NPS de minimis AMS  3.0  from Table 4  0.6  from Table 5 
   Current Overall  10.0  sum of above four components  23.9  sum of above four components 
       
Note 1: The notified value of production has been about $3.5 billion less than the USDA farm income series. This 
difference is assumed to rise to $4 billion by 2014.  Note 2: The notified value of production has been about 97.2% of 
the European Commission value of production series. Value of production is assumed to increase by 10% between the 
2000-02 average and 2014.  Note 3: EU payments of the type notified as blue were larger in the 2001-03 period than in 
2000-02. The EU’s “recent representative period” of the 2004 Framework is therefore assumed to be 2001-03.Table 4. U.S. Current Total AMS in 2001, 2004 (estimated) and 2014 (projected) (US$ million) 
   2001 notified     2004 (estimated)      2014 (projected) 
   AMS
a MPS
b LDP&MLG
c Other      AMS
a MPS
b LDP&MLG
c Other      AMS
a MPS
b LDP&MLG
c Other  
Barley              16.4   16.0 0.4   94.0    94.0     1.0   1.0  
Corn  1,269.7              1,193.5  76.2   3,495.2  3,419.0  76.2     
Cotton  2,810.1                   2,541.0  269.1   2,085.1  1,816.0  269.1 
Dairy  4,483.3  4,483.2                 0.1 5,009.8  4,509.8 500.0 5,199.5  5,199.5
Minor oilseeds  89.7    89.6          0.1             
Mohair  0.0        0.0     4.1     4.1        3.9     3.9    
Oats  4.2     4.2  0.0     3.0     3.0        1.0     1.0    
Peanuts  304.6  310.6     -6.0                               
Rice  762.9     728.0  34.9     141.9     107.0  34.9                
Sorghum  5.8     5.2  0.6     144.6     144.0  0.6                
Soybeans  3,610.0                        3,443.7  166.3 706.3  540.0  166.3
Sugar  1,061.0  1,031.7                 29.2 1,141.1  1,112.1 29.0 1,225.6  1,196.6 29.0
Tobacco
 
            
                       
                
-1.3   -1.3             
Wheat
 
189.4 176.6 12.8 93.8 81.0 12.8
Wool 0.0 0.0 7.8  7.8  7.4   7.4
All other products
d 21.7        21.7     21.7        21.7     21.7        21.7 
                                            
Sum of PS AMS  14,627.6              12,948.4              6,460.1          
Sum of de minimis PS AMS              93.8              2.0        
   Net of de minimis PS AMS              12,854.6              6,458.1       
                
             
     
 
   
NPS AMS  6,828.2          7,878.2 2,998.0
    MLA&CCP        4,639.8          5,650.3      (CCP assumed blue)  526.2 
    Crop Insurance        1,770.4          1,810.0          2,580.0 
    Other        418.0          418.0          418.0 
PS AMS+NPS AMS  21,455.8              20,826.6              9,458.1          
Current Total AMS  14,413.1              12,854.6              6,458.1          
Source: See Annex.  Notes: a. Aggregate Measurement of Support  b. Market Price Support  c. LDP&MLG: commodity loan forfeit, marketing loan gains, loan deficiency payments, and 
certificate exchange gains.   d. All other products (some are listed in past notifications (includes lentils, chickpeas, dry edible beans, dry peas and others), and some are listed (apples, 
apricots, cranberries, onions, peaches, pears, potatoes, rye, sheep and lamb, and tomatoes).  Non-bold AMS amounts indicate de minimis AMS. Boxed cells indicate larger decline from 
earlier year. The 2004 estimate is not crucial here but is included in order to illustrate roughly a more recent year than last notified year.  
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   2001/02 (notified EU-15)  2004 (estimated EU-15)  2014 (projected EU-15) 
  AMS  AAP
a ref price  quantity  AMS  AAP
a ref price  quantity  AMS  AAP
a ref price quantity 
   € mill.  €/tonne             
   




  € mill.  €/tonne  €/tonne
 
mill. t    
Common wheat  1,236.6       101.3   86.5  83.5  1,386.8  101.3 86.5 93.7  1,488.9  101.3 86.5 100.6
Durum wheat  0.0       101.3  
 
148.5  8.1                 
                 
         
         
0.0 101.3 148.5 9.4 0.0 101.3 148.5 10.2
C. wheat, maize, etc.  8.2 8.2 8.2
Barley  1,640.4       101.3   67.3  48.2  1,671.3  101.3 67.3 49.1  1,560.6 
 
101.3 67.3 45.9
Maize  379.6       101.3   91.9  40.3  369.3  101.3 91.9 39.3 385.4  101.3 91.9 41.0
Rye  212.9       101.3   67.3  6.3  0.0           0.0          
Oats  0.0       101.3   112.5  6.2  0.0           0.0          
Sorghum  10.2       101.3   85.7  0.7  10.0  101.3  85.7  0.6  10.4  101.3  85.7  0.7 
Triticale  179.4       101.3   67.3  5.3  161.4  101.3  67.3  4.8  180.2  101.3  67.3  5.3 
Rice (paddy)  396.6       298.4   143.3  2.6  17.4  150  143.3  2.6  17.4  150  143.3  2.6 
White Sugar  5,720.1       631.9   193.8  14.1  5,720.1  631.9          193.8 14.1  1,917.0  385.5 193.8 10.0
SMP  1,370.5    2,055.2   684.7  1.0  1,258.8  1952.4            684.7 1.0 777.5  1,746.9 684.7 0.7
Butter  4,443.5    3,282.0   943.3  1.9  3,796.2  3052.3          943.3 1.8  2,505.9  2,463.9 943.3 1.6
Beef  9,707.2    3,013.0   1,730  7.6  0.0  1,560.0              1,730 7.4 0 1,560.0 1,730 7.0
Milk  212.2   payment (de minimis AMS)   212.2   payment (de minimis AMS)   212.2   payment (de minimis AMS)  
Olive Oil  2,675.7  3,837.7  2,851.8  2.7  2,070.4  3,837.7  2,851.8  2.1  920.0  olive grove payment 
Tobacco  951.6  premium payment  951.6  premium payment     0          
Apples  2,059.5  EMS        2,059.5  EMS        2,059.5  EMS       
Tomatoes  1,944.2  EMS        1,944.2  EMS        1,944.2  EMS       
Wine  891.6  EMS        891.6  EMS        891.6  EMS       
Cotton  575.1  EMS            
         
  
                   
575.1  EMS 0.0   
Dried fodder  317.2  payment 317.2  payment 145.6  payment   
All other  4,569.3  payments and EMS  4,569.3  payments and EMS    4,569.3  payments and EMS 
Sum of PS AMS  39,501.7 
 
      27,990.6        19,593.9   
Sum of de min.  PS  AMS 220.4 237.8 220.4
   Net of de min. PS AMS  39,281.3        27,752.8         19,373.5        
NPS AMS  573.5  de minimis     573.5  de minimis (=2001/02)    573.5  de minimis (=2001/02)   
                                  
Current Total AMS  39,281.3            27,752.8           19,373.5       
Source: See Annex.  Note: a. Applied Administered Price.  Non-bold AMS amounts indicate de minimis AMS. Boxed cells indicate larger decline from earlier year. The 2004 estimate is 
not crucial here but is included in order to illustrate roughly a more recent year than last notified year.  
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Table 6. USA: Support Components and Constraints (US$ billion)              
Projected "Current"     Estimated 2014 components and constraints 
  Year      U.S. proposal    EU proposal    G-20 proposal 
   2004  2014        Sum  MUC     Sum  MUC     Sum  MUC 
                         
NPS AMS (de minimis)                   
                  
               
                
7.9  3.0 NPS  AMS  de minimis  allowance 6.5 6.5  2.6 2.6  9.6 9.6
PS AMSs (de minimis) 0.1  0.0 Sum of all PS AMS de minimis 
allowances  6.5 2.6 9.6
      Sum PS AMS de minimis allowances on 
products accounting for ½ of sector VOP  3.3 1.3 4.8
Current Total AMS  12.9  6.5    Total AMS commitment  7.6  7.6    7.6  7.6    5.7  5.7 
Sum of current components of 
AMS support  20.8 9.5  Sum of allowed components of AMS 
support  20.7 12.8 24.9
                      Maximum Usable Components (MUC)  17.4 11.5 20.1
           
               
   
                  




















   
Blue + Sum of current 
components  of AMS support 
(= Current Overall) 
20.8 10.0 Blue cap + Sum of allowed components 
of AMS support  25.5 22.5 34.5
                      Blue cap + MUC  22.2 21.2 29.7
                   
                 
   
      Overall commitment  22.5 22.5 19.2 19.2 12.0 12.0
                                      
Source: See Table 3 and Annex. 
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Table 7. EU-15: Support Components and Constraints (€ billion) 
Projected "Current"     Estimated 2014 components and constraints 
          2004  2014 U.S. proposal    EU proposal    G-20 proposal 
               Sum  MUC     Sum  MUC     Sum  MUC 
                        
NPS AMS (de minimis)     
              
                
                  
0.6  0.6 NPS  AMS  de minimis allowance  6.7  6.7    2.7  2.7    12.2  12.2 
PS AMSs (de minimis)  0.2  0.2    Sum of all PS AMS de minimis  allowances 6.7 2.7 12.2
    Sum PS AMS de minimis allowances on 
products accounting for ½ of sector VOP  3.4   1.3 6.1
Current Total AMS  27.8  19.4    Total AMS commitment  11.4  11.4    20.1  20.1    13.4  13.4 
Sum of current components 
of AMS support 
28.6 20.2 Sum of allowed AMS components  24.9 25.5 37.9
                       Maximum Usable Components (MUC)  21.5 24.2 31.8
                    
               
                      
                  
 
Blue  23.9 3.7  Blue cap  6.1 6.1  12.2 12.2  12.2 12.2
 
Blue + Sum of current 
components of AMS support     
(= Current Overall) 
52.5 23.9 Blue cap + Sum of allowed components of 
AMS support  31.0 37.8 50.2
                       Blue cap + MUC  27.6 36.4 44.0
                    
              
 
    Overall commitment  28.7 28.7  34.4 34.4  23.0 23.0
                                      












Sum of three components
Sum of all dm allowances 
(NPS and all PS)
TAMS commitment + 
NPS dm allowance
MUC = TAMS commitment + 
NPS dm allowance + 
sum of PS dm allowances on products accounting for 
part of sector VOP






sum of all 
PS de min
allowances e.g., sum of PS de min 
allowances on 1/2 of 
sector VOP 












































Figure 2: USA: Components and constraints
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Figure 3. EU: Components and constraints
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